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Abstract
Distributed Reactive Routing for Selective Forwarding Attack Resilience
in Wireless Sensor Networks
Jonathan T. Szymaniak
Supervising Professor: Dr. Shanchieh Jay Yang
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are an emerging technology that may one day
supply real-time information to many services and Internet-based applications. The
utility of WSNs relies on the ability to provide valid information, even in the presence
of failures or attackers. Current research in the field has identified a large variety of
attacks and countermeasures, however, few works address how WSN routing protocols
can autonomously react to detected attacks. The works that do provide attack-
reactive schemes generally require nodes to coordinate or exchange trust/detection
reports.
This work aims to maximize data delivery in the presence of selective forwarding
attacks with nodes performing detection and reaction operations independently. Via
modifications to the Collection Tree Protocol’s forwarding path and route update
procedure, nodes autonomously evaluate their parent’s forwarding reliability and du-
plicate data to alternative parent nodes when deemed necessary. As shown though a
number of simulations, this distributed scheme yields significant data recovery with
only modest overheads for attackers dropping data at medium to high rates.
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Glossary
B
Base Station In WSN literature, this term often refers to a location containing
both a sink node in the WSN and the data processing infrastructure (e.g.,
a desktop computer).
C
CTP Collection Tree Protocol. A tree routing protocol designed for TinyOS.
Notable aspects of this protocol include high data delivery rates, a link
quality-based routing gradient, adaptive route beaconing, addressless rout-
ing, mulit-gateway support, and routing loop detection and resolution.
G
Gateway In most WSN literature, this term is synonymous with “Base Station.”
However, this work uses the term Gateway to refer to a sink node in the
network that transmits data to another location for further processing via
an out-of-band communications channel. This slight difference in nomen-
clature addresses the Sensor-Cloud paradigm in which multiple Gateways
in a network may contribute received data to one or more Cloud systems.
M
Mote Sensor node platforms are typically referred to as “motes.” For examples
of such platforms, see:
http://www.memsic.com/products/wireless-sensor-networks/wireless-modules.html.
P
PRE Parent Reliability Estimator. The mechanism introduced in this work that
allows nodes to monitor the data forwarding reliability of their parents.
xPRV Parent Reliability Value. The metric associated with the PRE that quan-
tifies a parent’s forwarding reliability. This metric is represented by the
symbol, ρ, and has a nominal value of 1.0; increasing values indicate a less
reliable forwarder.
S
Selective Forwarding Attack An attacker correctly forwards some, but not all data
messages. This may have the effect of biasing the perception of the monitor
environment in the attacker’s favor.
T
THL Time Has Lived. A field in CTP data messages that denotes how many
hops a message has traversed.
W
WSN Wireless Sensor Network. A network of low-power embedded devices,
equipped with one or more sensors, monitoring an environment an prop-
agating sensed information toward one or more sinks in the network for
further processing. Communication is typically multi-hop, and 802.15.4
transceivers are commonly used.
1Chapter 1
Introduction
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) consist of low-power and low-cost embedded plat-
forms typically equipped with a microcontroller, a transceiver, and one or more sen-
sors. These devices are used to gather sensor data pertaining to an activity or phe-
nomena of interest and propagate this information toward one or more base stations
for further processing. Due to the relatively short transmission distance capabilities
of sensor node transceivers, messages are often relayed via a number of intermediate
nodes.
The low cost of embedded sensor platforms and the highly distributed nature of
communication in ad-hoc wireless networks allow WSNs to monitor large geographical
areas or harsh environments that are difficult to cover with traditional wired network
infrastructures. For example, WSNs have been used to monitor the movement of
glaciers, species population trends, and river levels for early flood detection [1]. Other
applications of WSNs include surveillance systems, medical patient monitoring, home
and office automation, theft detection, and industrial process monitoring [2][3].
With the ever decreasing cost of electronics, WSNs have great potential to become
a pervasive technology. As the Cloud Computing1 paradigm has become popular in
recent years, a number of researchers have begun investigating how Cloud Computing
may be used to access, store, process, and distribute the vast amount of information
obtained by WSNs [5][6]. In envisioning the future of data collection, processing, and
dissemination to end users, it is clear that the principal asset in Sensor-Cloud systems
is valid information. If end users are expected to make decisions utilizing information
gathered by WSNs, services must ensure the correctness of this information, especially
in the presence of failures or malicious users attempting to influence perceptions of
1A detailed definition of “Cloud Computing” can be found in [4].
2monitored events.
As detailed in [7], [8], [9], and [10], there are numerous methods by which attackers can
interfere with the operations of a WSN. To gain access to a network, an attacker may
physically compromise a node (which are often assumed to be unattended) and reverse
engineer the device’s firmware to extract network secrets (e.g., cryptographic keys)
and identify software vulnerabilities. Upon installing malicious software on a network
node, an attacker may then perform eavesdropping and traffic analysis attacks to
identify ideal locations in the network to mount an attack. Once an attacker has one
or more nodes participating in the network, he or she may then perform a variety
of attacks (e.g., rushing, sink hole, worm hole, Sybil) to acquire significant influence
over the flow of data in the network. In many cases, this influence is associated with
becoming a highly utilized member of a routing path. Once an attacker controls the
flow of information, he or she may tamper with or disrupt the flow of data. This
work will focus on a particular type of data flow disruption, referred to as a “selective
forwarding attack.” In this attack, a malicious node will forward some data correctly,
while dropping other messages. This type of attack may allow an attacker to suppress
the delivery of information that he or she does not want to be made accessible to end
users or services. If an attacker can suppress a significant amount of data, he or she
may be able to bias perceptions of the monitored events in his or her favor.
Defenses against the following attacks generally fall into the categories of prevention,
detection, and resilience through multipath routing. Prevention schemes tend to in-
clude either cryptographic authentication schemes that prevent unauthorized nodes
from participating on a network [11] [12] [13] [14], or countermeasures for specific
attacks [10] [15] [16]. Attack detection schemes seek to detect the presence of mali-
cious nodes by identifying anomalies [17] [18], or specification/rule violations [19] [20].
Multipath routing provides inherent resilience to failures and data flow attacks by du-
plicating data along multiple braided or disjoint paths, with the inevitable trade-offs
of increased network traffic and increased power consumption [21].
Although a great deal of work has been done in these areas, few works have addressed
how detection mechanisms may be used to facilitate distributed reactive routing de-
cisions, while targeting high data delivery in the presence of attackers. The work of
Sun et al. [22] details an attack-reactive routing scheme based a trust management
framework that involves nodes establishing, evaluating, and reporting the trustwor-
thiness of surrounding nodes. Using these trust metrics, Sun et al. showed, using
3hardware-based experiments, that such a framework can be effectively used to ex-
clude untrustworthy nodes from routing paths. However, as described in [22], the
problem of establishing and maintaining trust between nodes is a difficult problem,
especially in cases where attackers target the trust mechanism itself. [23] presents a
scheme in which nodes respond to detected attacks by initiating a clustering algorithm
that excludes the malicious node from the cluster, and attempting to wirelessly re-
program the malicious node. However, by utilizing schemes that introduce additional
interactions between nodes, the overall system’s attack surface is increased, possibly
yielding new opportunities for an attacker. The primary goal of this work is to deter-
mine if an effective attack-reactive scheme for selective forwarding attack resilience
can be achieved through autonomous and distributed decision-making, rather than a
coordinated effort between multiple nodes. This work also investigates the effective-
ness of opportunistically choosing secondary forwarder nodes only on an as-needed
basis, as opposed to explicit multipath construction as done in other works.
4Chapter 2
Background And Supporting Work
This chapter presents background information pertaining to existing work in WSN
security and the routing protocol used as a starting point for this work. First, an
overview of WSN threats is presented, followed by a discussion of associated counter-
measures provided by current work in the field. Next, the important features of the
Collection Tree Protocol are briefly described, and the opportunity for mounting a
selective forwarding attack on this protocol is presented.
2.1 Threats Facing Sensor Networks
As reported in [7] [8] [9], and [10], numerous classes of attacks on WSNs have been
explored. A summary of these threats is presented in Table 2.1, grouped by the stages
of an attack in which they might be utilized. Note that these categorizations of attacks
are not intended to describe a definitive attack model; they are presented here only
to conceptualize a possible procedure by which a WSN attack may be mounted.
The attacks labeled Reconnaissance & Preparation allow an attacker to first passively
study the network and then begin interacting with a subset of nodes, in order to
acquire the ability to actively participate on the network. As nodes are often assumed
to be left unattended, physical tampering or removal of a small number of nodes from
the network is considered a realistic and plausible threat. Eavesdropping may allow an
attacker to determine the optimal deployment of attacking nodes in order to achieve
his or her desired goals.
Upon gaining the ability to participate on the network, an attacker may need to
perform a preliminary set of actions to ensure the desired impact on the network is
feasible and that various protocol mechanisms can be effectively circumvented. Some
5of these actions are presented in the Acquiring Influence section of Table 2.1. In the
case of this work, “influence” is generally associated with a malicious node becoming a
trusted member of a heavily used routing path, providing an attacker with information
to steal, manipulate, or suppress. To become a member of one or more routing paths,
an attacker may perform a Sybil attack to fill neighbor nodes’ routing tables with
aliases for a malicious node, or to bad-mouth other viable neighbors. Alternatively,
an attacker may utilize a Sinkhole attack by reporting the availability of a route that
is shorter or more reliable than that of its neighbors.
Table 2.1: WSN threats, grouped by attack stage
Attack Stage Attack Class Description
Reconnaissance
& Preparation
Physical Capture An attacker obtains physical access to a node and up-
loads malicious code or extracts sensitive information
from the device (e.g., cryptographic keys).
Eavesdropping Attacker monitors wireless channel, attempting to
overhear sensitive information and/or deduce network
topology based upon traffic flow.
Acquiring
Influence
Sinkhole Malicious node falsely advertises high quality route in
order to “pull” routes toward it.
Wormhole Attacker relays messages between malicious nodes in
different parts of network using an out-of-band low la-
tency link. This attack allows the attacker to establish
a virtual route to a gateway that is significantly shorter
than neighboring nodes.
Sybil Malicious node acts as, or claims to neighbor, multi-
ple network node identities. This is particularly effec-
tive against mechanisms using a collaborative voting
scheme.
HELLO Flood or Rushing Malicious node transmits route request (“HELLO”)
messages at a TX power greater than legitimate nodes,
giving the impression of a higher quality link. If nodes
do not verify the ability to perform bidirectional com-
munication with the parent, this can result in a loss of
all upstream traffic.
End Goal
Information Theft Once an attacker has gained access to sensitive infor-
mation, he or she may use malicious nodes to log data.
Denial of Service An attacker may seek to exhaust the limited energy
sources of the legitimately nodes by intentionally caus-
ing collisions. The flow of information may also be sup-
pressed by jamming the wireless channel.
Selective Forwarding A malicious node forwards only a fraction of the data
it is requested to.
Spoofing and Tampering An attacker may falsify/modify packet data, source in-
formation, or acknowledgements.
Once an attacker’s malicious nodes are actively participating in a network, he or she
may then begin attempting actions intended to reach the ultimate goal of the attack.
In networks that propagate confidential information, Information Theft attacks may
6not physically impact network performance, but may present severe consequences
from a security perspective. On the other hand, denial of service (DoS) attacks may
be used to render the network unusable, removing a source of information in a greater
situation awareness system. Selective Forwarding, Spoofing and Tampering attacks
generally are not intended to hinder network performance, but rather, to poison or
bias the stream of information being served by the WSN. The latter class of attacks
involves the falsification of data or its origins in a manner that would benefit the
attacker. Selective forwarding attacks, on the other hand, refer to attackers dropping
a fraction of data messages they are requested to forward. Such an attack may be
intended to simply limit the rate at which information about a monitored environ-
ment is received, or to drop specific types of data in order to bias the perception of
monitored events. Note that even in cases where the confidentiality or authenticity
of data can be assured, selective forwarding is still a threat.
Selective forwarding attacks prove to be particularly interesting in WSNs due to the
existing challenges in communicating over a wireless channel. Often, it is difficult to
differentiate between messages dropped due to interference or malicious intent. Other
data-centric attacks such as tampering may prove more difficult for an attacker to hide
in cases where data corruption/modification is not a typical failure mode. Because of
the challenges associated with selective forwarding attacks, we have chosen to study
and address this particular attack class in our work. While an attack-reactive scheme
may ideally provide resilience to attack classes across the varying stages of an attack,
reacting to attacks in the End Goal stage is still valuable because it is in this stage that
an attacker begins attempting to damage the network or the validity of information
handled by the network.
2.2 Countermeasures
Existing work in the field of WSN security may be generalized into categories of pre-
vention, detection, multi-path resilience, and reaction mechanisms. While significant
work has been done in the first three categories, there are fewer reactive works and
opportunities for further improvements.
Preventative mechanisms seek to limit an attacker’s ability to eavesdrop on, join,
or participate in the network. This is typically achieved through authentication, or
by designing protocols to reduce the opportunity for specific attacks to be mounted.
7LEAP+ introduced methods by which cryptographic keys could be established be-
tween nodes and base stations, between pairs of nodes, between clusters of nodes, and
between all nodes in the network [11]. SPINS provides protocols for achieving data
confidentiality, broadcast authentication, and assurance of data freshness [24]. The
work of Ning, Liu, and Du introduced DoS resilience into a broadcast authentication
scheme, through the use of a mechanism referred to as “message-specific puzzles” [12].
The common elements in works on authentication in WSNs are generally “weak” au-
thenticators based upon chains of hashing functions. While modern cryptographic
schemes are believed to be too inefficient on the microcontrollers typically used in
WSN node platforms, hash chains have been shown to be easy to verify by nodes,
but computationally difficult to forge. Despite public key cryptography often being
regarded as too inefficient for use in WSNs, Liu and Ning have illustrated in both
theory and implementation the feasibility of using public key cryptography for confi-
dentiality and authentication purposes, via elliptic curve cryptography [13].
As previously noted, the physical capture of network nodes and the extraction of
network secrets is commonly regarded as a realistic threat, requiring additional layers
of preventative security, which often are intended to counter specific threats. For
example, INSENS, a multi-path routing scheme designed for attack resilience includes
an “echo-back” scheme intended to prevent successful attempts at carrying out a
rushing attack, in which an attacking node advertises route availability with a very
high transmission power, tricking downstream nodes into attempting to use a non-
existent link [25]. INSENS’s “echo-back” mechanisms allows nodes to verify the
bidirectional property of a link, thereby thwarting such an attack. Another example
of an attack-specific countermeasure is the concept of a packet-leash, introduced in
[9], designed to defend against wormhole attacks, in which malicious nodes tunnel
messages to different areas of a network through an out-of-band low latency link.
The packet-leash solutions presented by Hu, Perrig, and Johnson effectively limit the
geographic distance packets are able to travel, as well as the rate they can travel
[9].
Works on the detection of WSN attacks provide another layer of security, providing
situational awareness with respect to malicious actions in the network. These works
generally focus on identifying anomalous behavior that is indicative of an attack. In
their survey paper, Rajasegarar, Leckie and Palaniswami describe machine learning-
based approaches used in the field, including data clustering, support vector machines
models, and population density models [17]. These techniques generally require the
8use of specialized watchdog nodes in the network, due to the computational com-
plexity of the machine learning algorithms. For schemes intended to be run on the
“normal” network nodes, rule-based schemes have been explored. For example, [19]
presents a distributed scheme in which nodes monitor properties such as transmission
intervals, delays, repetition and integrity and compare these against known “good”
values in order to identify suspicious behavior. For the detection of selective for-
warding attacks specifically, [26] and [27] propose that gateways or checkpoint nodes
propagate reception acknowledgements back to nodes generating data; a failure to
receive such an acknowledgment is indicative of a selective forwarder in the routing
path. Our reactive scheme presented in this work leverages the Retransmission Rule
presented in [19], which seeks to determine whether or not a node has retransmitted
a message it was requested to forward. The choice of detection strategy was based
upon the notion that the Retransmission Rule evaluation could be performed pas-
sively by individual nodes, whereas the schemes presented in [26] and [27] require the
downstream propagation of additional acknowledgement traffic.
Another important focus in WSN security is attack-resilience; networks are designed
to operate in the presence of attackers. A significant number of works have investi-
gated the use of multipath routing to achieve attack resilience. Originally designed for
fault-tolerance, multipath routing duplicates data along multiple braided or disjoint
paths in order to increase the likelihood of the data reaching a sink node. Protocols
such as INSENS [25], SEEM [28], and H-SPREAD [29] have augmented the multipath
design philosophy with authentication, key establishment schemes, and preventative
measures. A thorough analysis of numerous secure multipath protocols can be found
in [21].
In reacting to attacks, this also work attempts to duplicate data messages along
duplicate paths. Unlike multipath routing schemes however, an end-to-end secondary
paths are not created and maintained as part of normal network operation. Instead,
a major goal of this work is in evaluating the effectiveness of simply choosing a
secondary forwarder on-the-fly when attacks are detected.
While numerous works have explore prevention, detection and multipath resilience,
far fewer efforts have been made to explore how the aforementioned works can be
combined to allow WSNs to automatically react to ongoing attacks in a manner
that will minimize the impact of attacks on network operations. In response to de-
tected attacks, the scheme presented in [23] reclusters a network to exclude malicious
nodes, and attempts to recover compromised nodes via over-the-air programming.
9The SARP protocol, detailed in [22], utilizes multi-dimensional trust metrics to al-
low nodes to evaluate and report the trustworthiness of neighboring nodes, and then
adapt their routes to avoid nodes deemed untrustworthy.
While both of these schemes allow networks to effectively react to attacks in an auto-
mated fashion, they require the use of auxiliary communication and coordination to
facilitate reactive actions; this implies some additional overhead and attack surfaces.
This work seeks to identify if a reactive scheme can be achieved with nodes making
reactive decisions independently, or with minimal auxiliary information exchanged
between nodes.
2.3 Collection Tree Protocol
To facilitate the design of a distributed and reactive routing scheme, the Collection
Tree Protocol (CTP) has been selected as a baseline protocol. CTP is included in
the the TinyOS1 operating system and protocol suite for low power sensor networks.
This particular protocol has been selected for its emphasis on reliability, efficiency,
adaptiveness with respect to varying link qualities, and availability in both simulation
and real-world implementations.
As reported by the authors in [30] and separately verified in [31], CTP is capable
of achieving 99.9% data delivery rates in networks with sufficient connectivity. One
of the major reasons for CTP’s success over other tree-based routing protocols is its
use of a link-quality based routing gradient, as opposed to a simple hop-count to
a root node. This metric, referred to as Estimated Transmissions (ETX), provides
nodes with an approximation of the number of transmissions required to propagate
a message to a sink node, considering the number of retransmissions needed along
each link. This metric is evaluated by monitoring both the incoming and outgoing
links shared between a node and its neighbors, and summing these estimates along a
path.
CTP evaluates outgoing links by maintaining counts of the number of data messages
transmitted to a neighboring node, and the number of acknowledgements (ACKs)
received from that node. Incoming links are estimated through the use of routing
beacons, which nodes use to advertise their current routing gradient information,
1http://www.tinyos.net/
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parent node, congestion status, and to request route updates. Each time a node
broadcasts a routing beacon, it increments a local beacon sequence number, which is
embedded into the routing beacon frame. By monitoring the gap between current and
previous beacon sequence numbers, a node can estimate the number of retransmission
attempts required to exchange a message with its neighbor. Both of these incoming
and outgoing link statistics are maintained over windows of data and routing beacon
messages. At the end of each window, CTP calculates the ETX associated with a
neighboring node using a weighted sum of both the current and previous link statistics,
which provides exponential smoothing of these estimates. The cost to reach a root
node in CTP is calculated by summing the ETX values along each hop.
Sink nodes in CTP advertise a nominal ETX of 0 to denote that they are roots of the
routing tree. This effectively yields an “addressless” scheme in which nodes do not
require a priori knowledge of sink node addresses, and instead discover paths to root
nodes in a distributed manner, based upon the fact the routing cost (ETX) should
always decrease along a path to a sink. This particular feature of CTP is noteworthy,
due to the potential for inherent fault and attack resilience through the addition of
root nodes to a network.
Currently, the available implementations of CTP do not provide security mechanisms
of any form2. In their survey of attacks and countermeasures in WSNs, Karlof and
Wagner note that CTP’s lack of authentication in route updates allows for malicious
nodes to perform a sinkhole attack by advertising a falsely low ETX in their routing
beacons [8]. They also note how wormhole attacks can be used to create subtrees in
CTP topologies, even if route updates were authenticated, and how malicious nodes
can induce routing loops through spoofing attacks.
In addition to the attacks on CTP described in [8], we have also found selective
forwarding attacks to be trivial to carry out in CTP. To aid in the description of
this attack, a graphical representation of the forwarding path present on each node
is presented in Figure 2.1.
2Therefore, the design of an attack-reactive scheme based upon CTP is believed to be novel work.
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Figure 2.1: CTP data forwarding path
As shown above, messages are added to a node’s Send Queue when:
• A local application generates new data
• A forwarding request is received from the link layer and a duplicate of the
message is not already in the Send Queue or in the Transmit Cache of previously
sent messages.
A timer event is used to determine when to dequeue a message and attempt to
transmit it to a node’s parent. Once a message has been dequeued, it is periodically
retransmitted to the parent node until the link layer signals reception of a MAC-
layer acknowledgement, or a retransmission limit is hit. The former case indicates
successful reception, whereas the latter is logged as a failure. Note that this scheme
only requires acknowledgement that a message has been received by the parent’s link
layer; no verification of the parent actually forwarding the message is required.
Therefore, to carry out a selective forwarding attack, an attacker only needs to sup-
press the operation of a message being inserted into the Send Queue. In terms of a
code injection attack on a mote platform, this may be achieved through the insertion
of a conditional branch intended to skip the message enqueue operation. From the
perspective of an attack model, this corresponds to a node ACKing a message, but
never forwarding it.
12
Chapter 3
Design of Reactive Routing Scheme
This chapter details the design of the reactive routing scheme for selective forwarding
attack resilience. As noted in the previous chapter, TinyOS’s CTP is used as a foun-
dation for this scheme due to its high data delivery goals, link-quality based routing
gradient, and inherent multi-gateway support. The designed mechanism consists of
two main modifications to CTP: a Parent Reliability Estimator (PRE) and changes
to the route update procedure. The PRE allows nodes to estimate whether a parent
node may be failing or maliciously dropping data messages, and categorize the parent
as being Good, Suspicious, or Unreliable. Based upon this categorization, the mod-
ified route update procedure is used to duplicate data through a secondary parent
node, or immediately blacklist the current parent and choose another. Figure 3.1
presents a high-level flowchart describing the design of our reactive routing scheme,
which is described in the following sections.
This chapter first establishes the scope of this work via a discussion of the threat
model and assumptions about attackers. Next, the PRE mechanism and its associated
metric are detailed. Finally, the modified route update procedure, which utilizes the
PRE metric for reactive decision-making, is presented.
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Figure 3.1: Reactive routing scheme flowchart
3.1 Threat Model and Assumptions
Our work focuses specifically upon selective forwarding attacks, in which an attacker
drops a fraction of all data messages it is requested to forward. As noted in the
following section, this work may easily be extended to also detect and react to data
tampering attacks, in which an attacker modifies the payload of a message before
forwarding it. However, the evaluation of data tampering resilience is left as a future
work.
The scope of attacker actions addressed in this work is limited to selective forward-
ing attacks only; it is assumed that the attacker will not modify, suppress, or spoof
CTP beacon message contents. Such attacks may be used to attack routes toward
the attacker, which may be considered a form of sinkhole attack. Instead of prevent-
ing such an attack from occurring, this mechanism seeks to react when data-level
attacks begin. Being that there are few, if any, works that apply such protections to
CTP specifically, this work leaves this aspect open to future investigation. Existing
work regarding the use of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (in TinyOS) may provide one
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possible avenue for introducing preventative defenses into CTP [12].
In order to simplify simulation models, attacking nodes will be assumed to randomly
(with a uniform distribution) drop a static, fixed percentage of data messages they
are requested to forward. Although a real-world attacker would be likely to drop data
based upon its content, origin, or relation to ongoing events, this simplified model is
intended to be a first step in determining if the designed reactive routing mechanism
is capable of yielding improvements.
As noted in Section 2.3, CTP utilizes a MAC-layer acknowledgement to determine
when a parent node has successfully received a data message; there is an inherent
assumption that the parent node will correctly forward the message, given that its
forwarding buffer has not overfilled. A violation of this assumption proves to be
an effective means to carry out a selective forwarding attack on the CTP protocol.
By responding with the MAC-layer ACK, regardless of whether or not it actually
forwards the data, a malicious node can attempt to maintain a high data-based ETX
(as calculated by its child). Through its data-based ETX calculations, CTP provides
inherent resilience to selective forwarding attacks that suppress MAC-layer ACKs;
after repeated un-ACKed transmission attempts, the victim child node will eventually
deduce that its has a low quality link to its parent and seek to chose a different parent
node. Because of this inherent resilience, this work’s selective forwarding attack model
focuses on the case which CTP is vulnerable: when an attacker that does not suppress
MAC-layer acknowledgement of received data messages.
3.2 Parent Reliability Estimator
3.2.1 Design Overview
One of CTP’s major improvements over other tree-routing schemes is its use of a
routing gradient that considers link quality, rather than hop counts alone. This im-
provement is achieved through CTP’s usage of the 4-bit link estimator [30]. This work
seeks to further extend the success of this design decision by also considering nodes’
data forwarding reliability into CTP’s parent selection procedure. The mechanism
by which this work monitors a parent node and quantifies its forwarding reliability is
referred to as a Parent Reliability Estimator (PRE).
The PRE is designed to address a selective forwarding attack (or failure) than can
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arise if a CTP node replies to a data message with a MAC-layer ACK, but does not
actually retransmit the packet. Per the retransmission rule presented in [19], the PRE
listens for the parent’s retransmissions of data messages that have been previously
sent. Unlike [19], this retransmission rule is evaluated by each node individually,
instead of by network monitors and neighboring nodes. By monitoring the number
of messages a parent correctly forwards over time, a node’s PRE labels the current
parent as being Normal, Suspicious, or Unreliable. When the parent’s PRE state is
Normal, a node assumes that no failures or attacks are associated with its parent,
and operates per the baseline CTP specification. An Unreliable parent is one that
has repeatedly failed to forward a significant amount of data and cannot be trusted;
a node blacklists this parent node and selects a different parent. A state of Suspicious
is used to indicate to the routing protocol that preliminary action should be taken
for a possibly failing or attacking parent. The purpose of this middle state is to
allow a node to react before significant data loss occurs, but in a way that will not
significantly hinder network operations should the state be asserted as a result of a
false positive. The reactive actions associated with a Suspicious parent consist of
selecting a secondary parent and addressing data messages to both the primary and
secondary parents. The remainder of this section discusses the design of the PRE.
The following section details secondary parent selection and usage, as well as the
associated route update process.
3.2.2 Changes to the CTP Forwarding Path
In order to facilitate the monitoring of a parent node, an additional message cache has
been introduced into the CTP forwarding path, as shown in Figure 3.2. Conceptually,
this additional cache is needed because the existing Transmit Cache is designed to be
small, and is only concerned with determining if a message has been previously sent
(to any parent). Therefore, we need a slightly larger cache that tracks messages sent
to a specific parent. These caches are shown as separate entities in Figure 3.2, but
could certainly be implemented in a manner that re-uses common data structures to
conserve memory.
As messages are removed from the CTP Send Queue due to reception of a MAC-layer
ACK, message data is inserted into both the existing Transmit Cache and a new PRE
Cache. The determination of which message fields are copied into the PRE cache
would be dictated by implementation-specific memory requirements. At a minimum,
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an implementation could store only the data frame fields required to identify the data
message, such as the origin and sequence number (3 bytes). However, to additionally
ensure the integrity of messages retransmitted by a parent, the storage of a message
authentication code (MAC) is also recommended1. Note that an implementation
capable of verifying the integrity of a retransmitted message could potentially detect
and react to data tampering attacks. As the scope of this work is limited to selective
forwarding attacks, this will not be addressed further here.
Figure 3.2: CTP forwarding path with PRE cache
3.2.3 Calculation of PRE Metric
As ACK’d messages are copied into the PRE cache, the TinyOS snoop interface is
used to overhear messages sent by a node’s parent and mark the corresponding entries
in the PRE cache (see Appendix A). This process is carried out over a window of
wPRE messages. At the end of this window, a node computes the current Parent
Reliability Value (PRV) ρi, using number of messages sent to the parent (ns), the
number of messages forwarded by the parent (nf ), and the previous PRV (ρi−1). The
evaluation of ρi is shown in (3.1). ρ0 is initialized to a nominal value of 1.0 when
nodes are added to the CTP routing table2.
1CTP does not currently compute and include MACs into message frames; this functionality, as described
in [11] and [24], would first need to be integrated into to CTP.
2Given the limited number of entires in the CTP routing table, this initialization may be abused by an
attacker that has accumulated an unfavorable PRV. By halting its routing beacons, an attacking node can
attempt to be removed from a victim node’s routing table. Once removed from the routing table, the
attacker can resume beaconing to be re-added to routing tables with ρi initialized to 1.0. Therefore, it is
recommended that entries removed from the CTP routing table have their PRVs stored in memory in order
to be retrieved upon re-insertion into the table.
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ρi = αPRE
ns
nf
+ (1− αPRE) ρi−1 (3.1)
As done with CTP’s ETX calculation, exponential smoothing is achieved through the
use of a weighting factor αPRE. Due to possibility of noise and collisions in a wireless
channel, as well as the likelihood that a node may not have its radio in receive mode
at the moment which its parent forwards a data message, a low weighting factor is
required; a low value favors the parent’s previous forwarding history, and attempts
to smooth any transient fluctuations in order to reduce false positive assertions of a
Suspicious or Unreliable state.
Given that the PRV is evaluated over windows of messages, it follows that the PRE’s
response time in detecting a failing or attacking node is a function of wPRE, αPRE ,
and the rate at which a node sends messages to its parent. To achieve an initial
estimate of response times and the PRE’s detection capabilities, the PRVs associated
with varying attackers and are plotted for αPRE = 0.1 and αPRE = 0.25 in Figures
3.3 and 3.4, respectively. A window limit of wPRE = 10 is used for both of these
cases, as well as in simulations.
As shown in the plot for αPRE = 0.1, the PRVs for attackers dropping 50% or more
data quickly rise above 1.5 within 75 messages. Detection of a 35% attacker may be
possible after approximately 200 messages. Unfortunately, attack rates below 35% do
not appear to significantly raise the PRV value, and may not be differentiable from
channel-related failures or missed transmissions due to a node’s radio not being in
the receive state.
The αPRE = 0.25 plot shows that this choice in weighting factor results in a much
faster response. Only 30 messages are needed for the PRV of attackers dropping
more than 50% of their data to reach approximately 1.5. A 35% attacker reaches
this PRV with 110 messages. Similar to the αPRE = 0.1 case, the PRVs associated
with attackers below a drop rate of 35% converge to values that are likely too low to
differentiate with “noise,” (albeit, at a quicker rate).
Based upon Figures 3.3 and 3.4, αPRE = 0.25 appears to be a better choice in the
sense that it would allow for a quicker assertion of Suspicious or Unreliable statuses
for malicious or failing nodes. As previously noted, however, channel collisions and
missed transmissions may result in transient spikes in PRV values.
In order to obtain insight into PRV variability with respect to a choice in αPRE , we
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Figure 3.3: PRVs over forwarded messages, for αPRE = 0.1
Figure 3.4: PRVs over forwarded messages, for αPRE = 0.25
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attempt to create a very simple model the aforementioned variations via a random
uniform distribution of 10,000 ns
nf
values in the range [1.00, 1.55]. These random ns
ns
values are grouped into windows of 10 “messages” in order to calculate an associated
PRV. This effectively yields a sample of 1,000 PRV’s. This process is repeated for
αPRE = {0.10, 0.15, 0.20, 0.25}, and a boxplot is created for each case. As shown in
Figure 3.5, these variations noticeably increase with αPRE .
The plots’ upper “whiskers” provide approximations of the lowest Suspicious state
PRV threshold that may be used without incurring too many false positives. This
upper bound on PRV variations would likely increase further due to missed retrans-
missions for entire windows during periods of congestion and frequent collisions. It is
recommended that a lower αPRE value, such as 0.10 or 0.15, is used to reduce false
positives. Ultimately, the choice of this parameter for a particular application requires
a thorough analysis of target operating environment and network configuration. As
such, the optimal αPRE is not determined here; a value of 0.10 is used in simulations
to test slower, but more effective responses.
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Figure 3.5: PRVs over 10,000 forwarded messages, for various αPRE values
3.3 Reactive Routing Decisions
Armed with a quantification of a parent node’s forwarding reliability, a node can
change it’s routing behavior in a manner that increases the likelihood that its data
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will reach a gateway. A node’s routing decisions are based upon its parents state, as
deduced by ρ, and two thresholds, TSuspicious and TUnreliable. The association between
the parent state and ρ is shown in (3.2). The following subsection describes the use
of these values and how they relate to a modified version of the CTP route update
process.
Parent State =


Normal 1.0 ≤ ρ < TSuspicious
Suspicious TSuspicious ≤ ρ < TUnreliable
Unreliable TUnreliable ≤ ρ <∞
(3.2)
3.3.1 Secondary Parent
When a route update occurs, a node’s PRV is checked to determine if the parent is
marked Suspicious. If so, the node chooses a secondary parent using the procedure
described in the following section and reports the secondary parent’s address in future
data frames. To facilitate this, 2 bytes have been appended to the end of the standard
CTP data and routing frames, as shown in Figure 3.6. The node continues unicast-
ing messages toward the suspicious parent, but does not explicitly unicast duplicate
messages to the secondary parent. This is done to reduce both network transmission
overhead and complexity; if a node were to unicast the message to two parents, ad-
ditional processing would be required to manage queuing and retransmission policies
for both parents. A simple implementation might remove a message from the CTP
Send Queue after first sending to the primary parent and then to the secondary par-
ent; such an implementation would likely suffer from decreased throughput. Instead,
the TinyOS Snoop interface is again used to facilitate the reception of messages by
a secondary parent. As shown in the pseudocode presented in Appendix A, upon
detecting that its address has been set in the Secondary Parent field of a data frame,
a node will process the message as if it had been received via unicast.
While the use of the Snoop Interface alleviates the need to retransmit a message to a
second node, it introduces the risk of the secondary parent not receiving the message.
In CTP, a node will attempt 30 retransmissions to a parent before asserting a send
failure3. This is expected to be sufficient with respect to wireless channel conditions;
3This behavior is defined by MAX RETRIES in CtpForwardingEngine.h. If a radio does not support
acknowledgements, a message is only sent once, without any retransmissions. This information was obtained
from the current TinyOS version at the time of writing (i.e., version 2.1).
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Figure 3.6: CTP frames with added secondary parent field
if the channel conditions alone prevent a node’s secondary parent from receiving a
message, it is certainly possible the conditions also prevented successful reception by
the node’s parent. As a result, retransmissions to the node’s parent may help ensure
the secondary parent receives the message. The secondary parent’s radio state is
another major factor that may contribute to failures in this scheme. Because nodes
do note reply with ACKs to snooped messages, a node has no means to determine if
the secondary parent received a message4.
Keeping in mind that the Suspicious state is intended to be a transient state between
the assertion of the Normal and Unreliable states, we believe that this opportunistic
approach to utilizing a secondary parent is congruent with the design goals of CTP
and our reactive mechanism. During a period when a node is not able to determine
if its parent is failing or attacking, the secondary parent functionality is intended to
ensure that at least some data is received. If the assertion of the Suspicious state is
the result of a false positive, then only some additional transmission overhead and
data duplication have been incurred. On the other hand, if the Unreliable state is
eventually asserted, some portion of dropped data may have been recovered. Although
4Technically, the Snoop Interface can be used to listen for the secondary parent’s retransmission, as done with
the parent monitoring in this work. This is not done here in order to reduce complexity and “bookkeeping”
requirements associated with the reactive scheme.
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not all of the dropped data will have been recovered, ideally, the state of the monitored
environment will be possible to infer from recovered data messages.
In the case where a node has not selected or was not able to select a secondary
parent, reserved addresses are placed in the associated data message field. This is to
maintain a consistent size of the data frame, as well as to support the reactive routing
decisions detailed in the following section. Table 3.1 presents the reserved addresses
in this work’s modification of CTP and the meaning of each address.
Table 3.1: Reserved addresses in reactive routing scheme
Reserved Address Value Description
INVALID ADDR 65535 Used in Destination Address field by CTP to
denote node has no route. Not used in Sec-
ondary Parent field.
NO SECONDARY NEEDED 65534 Indicates node’s PRV does not require selec-
tion of a secondary parent.
NO SECONDARY FOUND 65533 Indicates node’s PRV requires a secondary
parent, but no candidate nodes were found.
3.3.2 Modified Route Update Procedure
A modified version of the CTP route update procedure is used to select primary and
secondary parents in a manner that will avoid failing or attacking nodes. As noted in
the previous section, the assertion of the Suspicious status results in node selecting
and using a secondary parent at the next scheduled route update process; this delayed
response is intended to maintain standard CTP operation during the transition to the
Suspicious state. The transitionfrom Suspicious to Unreliable, however, immediately
triggers a route update and blacklisting of the current parent.
A preliminary implementation of this work utilized the existing CTP route update
procedure, which chooses the “best” parent candidate based upon the ETX metric.
However, a number of very high message latencies and THLs were observed. Upon
further investigation, it was discovered that the blacklisting and secondary parent
functionality was inducing large routing loops, especially when sibling nodes reacted
at approximately at the same time; as parent selection is not coordinated between
nodes, they would often select one another or their children. Although the baseline
CTP functionality eventually resolves loops, it is undesirable to induce any taxing
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behavior in the network5. Therefore, modifications to the CTP route update process
have been made to force better selections for primary and secondary parents.
The modified route update process (pseudocode presented in Appendix B) utilizes not
only the 1-hop and path ETX values, but the primary and secondary parent values
broadcast in data and routing frames. Based upon these fields and information that
can be deduced from information in the routing table, each routing table entry is as-
signed a “candidate score”, as shown in Table 3.2. The route update procedure sorts6
potential candidate by this candidate score, where a lower value indicates a better
candidate. Entries’ path ETXs are used as a secondary sorting criteria. Not shown in
Table 3.2 is the case where the routing table is a gateway7, which is associated with
a score of 0.
When a node’s parent is marked Normal, the candidate scoring procedure is not per-
formed, and parent selection is performed using only ETX values. For the Suspicious
and Unreliable states, Table 3.2 establishes the priority of candidates based upon
entries’ advertised parent and secondary parent fields. Routing table entries that
report a (secondary) parent that is a child of the node performing the route update,
blacklisted, or invalid (i.e., entry has no route) are considered not to be viable op-
tions; these would result in a loop, usage of an untrusted node, or a “dead end,”
respectively.
When a node’s parent is Suspicious and a routing table entry is a sibling node, it
is only considered viable if it reports having a non-problematic secondary parent, or
that no secondary parent is needed. The prioritization of these two options has been
selected to favor distrust of the parent in order to err on the side of caution. Again,
secondary parent selections that would induce loops or the use of an untrusted node
are avoided. A node should never select another node as both its parent or secondary
parent; this case is also considered invalid. Lastly, if a node reports “Couldn’t Find
Secondary,” it is implied that the entry also believes the shared parent to be suspi-
cious, but was unable to find a viable secondary parent. This might be indicative of
5Recall that in CTP route beaconing rates increase during periods of routing loops and congestion. See [30],
[31], [32] for more details.
6A sorting operation is not actually recommended due to efficiency concerns. As done in the TinyOS CTP
implementation, the best candidate can be identified via a single pass through the routing table using a
few temporary variables.
7Denoted by an advertised ETX of 0. Ideally, some form of broadcast authentication [12] [33] would be used
to prevent the abuse of this special case.
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a problematic or leaf section of the network, and thus, the entry is not considered a
viable secondary parent.
If the routing table entry is neither problematic nor a direct sibling, prioritization is
based upon the entry’s secondary parent field. The “best” choices (in order) are cases
where the secondary parent is a sink, is not needed, or is another non-problematic
node. In the event that such cases are not available, cases with less viable secondary
parents will be considered. These cases first favor the use of the suspicious parent
and routing loops, as there’s a chance that the parent may forward the data, and
the data can be kept alive via the loop. The remaining “worst-case” scenarios are
considered if the aforementioned cases are not available.
Also shown in Table 3.2, in the event that a parent is marked Unreliable and then
blacklisted, more stringent conditions are imposed in order to ensure a parent with
a viable route is selected. Again, the ideal candidate is a sink node with a good
link quality. The next best cases include nodes who report not needing a secondary
parent, or using a non-problematic secondary parent. For simplicity, the other “worst-
case” scenarios are not considered to be viable options; a node will instead choose to
advertise no route with the Pull-bit set, awaiting for a more trustworthy route before
continuing its data forwarding.
To comply with the existing CTP design specification, a node may also switch from
its suspicious parent to a different node in the event that this second node has a
significantly lower ETX value8. This functionality is intended to ensure the usage of
links with good connectivity. If sufficient memory is available on a mote platform, it
is recommended that a node’s PRV be saved when no longer using it as a parent, such
that it may be referenced if ever switching back to it. Although not covered in Table
3.2, an application may require that a node never switch from a Normal parent to
Suspicious (or Unreliable) node. This functionality, mentioned here for completeness,
is left as configurable feature. In applications where data loss or tampering may not be
detrimental, some memory overhead can be reduced by not storing PRVs of previous
parents. On the other hand, this memory trade-off and more strict parent change rule
may prove worthwhile in an application that necessitates valid information.
8The authors of CTP define “significantly” to mean an ETX 2.0 lower if the current parent is not congested,
and 1.5 if it is.
2
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Table 3.2: Routing table candidate scoring
Parent Status Entry’s Parent Entry’s Secondary Parent Candidate Score
Other My Parent My Child Blacklisted Invalid No Secondary Needed Other My Child My Parent Blacklisted No Secondary Found
Suspicious 1 X X X X X X DNC
1 X X X X X X DNC
1 X X X X X X DNC
1 1 DNC
1 1 DNC
1 1 DNC
1 1 DNC
1 1 7
1 1 8
1 1 6
1 1 5
1 1 3
1 1 4
1 1 2
1 1 1
Unreliable 1 X X X X X X DNC
1 1 X X X X X X DNC
1 X X X X X X DNC
1 1 DNC
1 1 DNC
1 1 DNC
1 1 2
1 1 1
Legend
X Don’t Care
1 Condition True
DNC Do Not Consider
# Score. Lower indicates “better”
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Chapter 4
Simulation Results and Analysis
4.1 Simulation Methodology
To evaluate the effectiveness of the reactive scheme described in the previous chap-
ter, a simulation implementation was developed for Castalia1, a WSN simulator built
on top of the OMNeT++2 discrete event network simulator framework. The CTP
implementation developed and evaluated in [31] was used a starting point for modi-
fications3. The performance of this baseline CTP implementation was first evaluated
in the simulator, and results similar to those reported in [30] and [31] were obtained,
verifying that this model was a valid starting point.
Simulations were performed on a 100 node, 10 x 10 grid topology. Although the
number of nodes could have been a variable change with simulation sets, this was
found to only achieve an increased load on nodes close to a gateway, and provide
an increased amount of data for attackers to drop. The former is a general issue
with network scalability, as it pertains to CTP; as network load increases the ex-
pected behavior is increased congestion and collisions. As the effect of the reactive
scheme upon networks with poor connectivity is investigated in another set of simu-
lations, this was deemed unnecessary to simulate. Furthermore, an increased number
of nodes was not found to yield significantly interesting results, given that attackers
drop a fixed percentage of data; the same general impact would occur as the attacker
dropped approximately the same percentage, albeit of more data. As such, 100 nodes
was deemed sufficiently realistic for simulations, considering the sizes of real-world
1http://castalia.npc.nicta.com.au/
2http://www.omnetpp.org/
3http://code.google.com/p/ctp-castalia/
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testbeds such as Tutornet4, Kansei5, and MoteLab6. Given that the random com-
ponent of Castalia’s path loss model varies (deterministically) with each additional
simulation repetition, geographical topology changes were also deemed unnecessary;
examination of raw simulation logs showed that different paths were used between
successive simulations, and bad links occasionally were exercised. In short, differ-
ent routing tree “topologies” were effectively exercised via changes to link qualities,
rather than geographical placement.
In order to emulate realistic channel conditions, Castalia’s log-loss path loss model,
non-bidirectional links, and additive interference were used for all simulations. Data
flow on the simulation networks was modeled via 20 second sampling periods on
non-gateway nodes, with a 90% likelihood of each sampling “event” resulting in a
node generating a data message. A 10 second initialization period was allowed at
the beginning of simulations for nodes to construct initial routes, after which the 20
second data generation period began. A 5 second jitter was added to node startup
times in order to avoid nodes being unrealistically synchronized and to avoid all
nodes in the network attempting to transmit at the same time. Simulations were
carried out over a duration of 3,000 seconds (simulation time), yielding a total of 150
data generation periods. For 150 data generation periods with 99 nodes generating
data with 90% probability, approximately 13,365 data messages were expected to be
generated in each simulation.
When present in the simulation, selective forwarding attackers began attacking at
the first data generation period. As the amount of data passing through attacking
nodes is expected to vary with their placement in the network, we expect to see fluc-
tuations in the amount of data attackers are able to drop between various simulation
configurations and even successive runs of the same configuration, as link qualities
are (deterministically) randomized. The 3,000 second simulation duration was chosen
to allow ample time for detection, reaction, and post-reaction stabilization to occur.
Based upon Figure 3.3, we see that approximately 350 messages are needed to detect
a single 50% attacker, using a PRV thresholds at 2.0. If 1
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of the network’s traffic flows
through the attacker, we expect detection to begin occurring after approximately 16
data generation periods. This leaves approximately 134 remaining data periods for
the reactive mechanism to then perform data duplication and blacklisting, as well as
4http://enl.usc.edu/projects/tutornet/
5http://kansei.cse.ohio-state.edu/KanseiGenie/
6http://motelab.eecs.harvard.edu/
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to verify that the network to reaches and remains in a steady state.
The general simulation strategy consisted of 30 simulation repetitions per variable
change, and each simulation group was divided into three sets: the test with the
baseline CTP implementation and no attacks, the same test with the baseline CTP
implementation with attacks, and lastly, the reactive CTP scheme with attacks. Data
was then extracted from the simulation repetitions in which the introduction of the
attacker into the baseline CTP implementation resulted in more than a 5% reduction
in the amount of data delivered to the gateway.
The metrics used to evaluate simulation results consisted of data delivery ratios
(DDR), data duplication ratios, average message latencies, and the number of trans-
mitted data messages and routing beacons. The DDRmetric, shown in (4.1) quantifies
the amount of data generated by source nodes that reaches a gateway node. This
metric was used in [31] to evaluate the Castalia-CTP implementation and verify the
99% delivery rate reported in [30].
DDR =
# Unique data messages received at gateways
# Unique data messages generated by nodes
(4.1)
The data duplication ratio metric, shown in (4.2), is intended to capture the degree
to which the same data messages are repeatedly received at gateways. Based upon
the nature of our reactive scheme, we expect the amount of duplicate data reaching
gateways increases, when compared to the baseline CTP implementation. However,
we would expect that this increase should be minimal on networks without ongo-
ing attacks; a significant increase in duplicated data may be an indicator of false
positive assertions of the Suspicious parent state and unneeded use of secondary par-
ents. Furthermore, a significantly large data duplication ratio observed in simulations
with ongoing attacks may indicate too large of a gap between the selected values of
TSuspicious and TUnreliable.
Data Duplication Ratio =
Total # data messages received at gateways
# Unique messages received at gateways
− 1 (4.2)
The average message latency metric presents an approximation for the amount of
time required for messages to traverse the network, from source to sink. High values
are generally indicative of the frequent occurrence of routing loops. We expect some
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increase in average message latencies when reacting to attacks, as non-optimal routes
may be used to avoid attacking/failing nodes.
Lastly, the number of data and beacon transmissions is used to identify additional
traffic generated by this scheme. While some additional traffic is expected due to
the use of secondary parents and the reseting of CTP’s route beaconing timer with
induced route updates, a minimal increase is desired.
The results presented in the remainder of this chapter, shown in boxplots, have been
formatted using the default MATLABR© settings7. Boxplot edges correspond to the
25th (q1) and 75
th (q3) percentiles, and the red bar between these edges represents the
median. Plot “whiskers” extend to the last datapoints not considered to be outliers,
and outliers are plotted separately as red +’s. Equation (4.3) presents the conditions
under which a data point, p, is considered an outlier. More information on this can
be obtained from the MATLABR© website8.
q3 + 1.5 ∗ (q3 − q1) < p < q1 − 1.5 ∗ (q3 − q1) (4.3)
4.2 Operation Over Decreasing Link Quality
The goal of this simulation group is to determine a spacing in the grid topology that
yields satisfactory network connectivity, such that it could be used for successive
simulations. Secondly, these simulations are intended to verify the expected behavior
of false positive secondary parent usage and blacklisting increasing the rate of network
degradation under poor link qualities. In this simulation group, no attacks were
included. Instead, the distance between nodes in the grid topology was varied between
{10, 20, 30, 40} m. Via Castalia’s path loss model, the increased distances between
nodes yielded decreasingly reliable links.
The DDR results associated with this simulation group are presented in Figure 4.1. In
these plots, we see for 10 m spacing, our reactive scheme generally operates around the
nominal 99% delivery rate. For a TSuspicious set too low, an outlier may be indicative
of congestion induced by frequent false positives and use secondary parents. As we
increase the node spacing from 10 m to 20 m, we see little impact on performance
7As of Student Version 7.10.0 (R2010a)
8http://www.mathworks.com/help/toolbox/stats/boxplot.html
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for sufficiently high thresholds, but a more severe response to thresholds set too
low. At 30 and 40 m spacing, we see that the link qualities become poor enough
that CTP begins experiencing low data delivery rates. In these cases, our reactive
scheme acts like an unbounded, positive feedback system; as poor links make nodes
appear suspicious, child nodes begin duplicating extra traffic, inducing congestion
and interference. With few viable neighbors, the act of blacklisting neighboring nodes
leaves no paths for data to travel. Evidence of this excessive traffic generation can
be seen in Figure 4.2. For completeness, the average message latencies and data
duplication associated with this simulation group are also presented in Figures 4.3
and 4.4, respectively. In these plots we see the same general trend in our overheads
rapidly increasing with decrease link quality. It is important to note however, that
these data points are associated only with messages that reached the gateway; this
is why data duplication actually appears to improve in some cases for the larger
spacings.
It is clear that in the 10 m spacing case, nodes have numerous options for rout-
ing, perhaps too many possible routes to be realistic. On the other hand, a 30 m
spacing appears to border on unstable cases for the baseline CTP implementation.
Therefore, we select the 20 m spacing to use as the testbed for remaining simula-
tions, as it produces little overhead or performance degradation for carefully selected
thresholds.
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Figure 4.1: Data delivery ratios on networks with varied node spacing
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Number of Transmissions for Varied Node Spacing
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Figure 4.2: Increased secondary parent traffic generated as link qualities decrease
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Average Message Latencies for Varied Node Spacing
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Figure 4.3: Increased message latencies induced by decreasing link qualities
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Data Duplication Ratios for Varied Node Spacing
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Figure 4.4: Increased data duplication induced by decreasing link qualities
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4.3 Varying Suspicious and Blacklist Thresholds for a Single
50% Attacker
This second simulation group was selected to investigate the effectiveness against
the designed reactive scheme against a single attacker, using various TSuspicious and
TUnreliable thresholds on the 20 m spacing grid topology. The attacker was config-
ured to drop 50% of the data it was requested to forward, and was placed near the
gateway in order to maximize its ability to adversely affect data delivery. 11 differ-
ent placements, within 3 hops from the gateway, were tested, with 30 repetitions for
each placement. This process was repeated for attacks on the baseline CTP imple-
mentation, and then again for attacks on the reactive CTP implementation. A set
of simulations run on the baseline CTP implementation with no attacks was used
as a reference for comparing overheads induced by our reactive scheme. The results
for this simulation group are presented in Figure 4.5. The notation used in the x-
axis of these plots is: NRS for results that include attacks but do not include the
reactive scheme, [TSuspicious, TUnreliable] for results that include the reactive scheme
with the noted thresholds, and Baseline for results with no attack and no reactive
scheme.
Ideally, a PRV of 2.0 would correspond to only hearing a parent forward 50% of data
messages sent to it. Therefore, we would expect setting thresholds at or below 2.0 will
allow our mechanism to effectively react to an attacking node, given that it is not the
only path to the gateway. The NRS boxplot in Figure 4.5’s Data Delivery Ratio plot
shows that our 50% attacker was generally able to reduce the network’s data delivery
ratio below 90%. Based upon the Data Delivery Ratio plot in Figure 4.5, we see
that the reactive scheme does prove effective for [TSuspicious = 2.0 , TUnreliable = 4.0]
and [TSuspicious = 2.0 , TUnreliable = 3.5], with the exception of a severe outlier. This
outlier is the result of a congested node, being the only viable route 1-hop away from
the gateway, becoming blacklisted.
We also see that some data recovery is achieved using higher thresholds, such as [3.0,
4.5] and [2.5, 4.5]. As noted in the discussion of Figure 3.5, we do not expect that
a node will overhear all of it’s parent’s retransmission; for an attacker dropping 50%
of received data, we may see PRVs well above 2.0. Therefore, when an attacker’s
PRV temporarily spikes above 3.0, we see some data recovery from the [3.0, 4.5] and
[2.5, 4.5] cases, as secondary parents are put to use. As we lower our thresholds,
nodes begin using secondary parents ealier, resulting in much greater data recovery.
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When an attacker’s PRV spikes above TUnreliable it becomes blacklisted, and future
data is routed away from the attacker. Note that in the boxplots that share the
same TSuspicious value, but differ in TUnreliable by 0.5, the case with the lower TUnreliable
value results in slightly better data recovery, as the attacking node is blacklisted more
quickly (if at all).
This plot also indicates a danger in setting thresholds too low. An investigation of
the TSuspicious = 1.5 outlier cases showed frequent false positive assertions resulted it
overuse of the secondary parent functionality, effectively overburdening the network
and inducing congestion and interference failures.
The remaining three plots in Figure 4.5 provide insight with respect to overheards
introduced by the reactive scheme. In these plots, the reference results are the Base-
line (no attacks, no reactive scheme). First note that the “best” cases for DDR
([TSuspicious = 2.0 , TUnreliable = 4.0] and [TSuspicious = 2.0 , TUnreliable = 3.5]) did not
significantly affect the average message latency of the delivered data, and that only
moderate overhead was introduced in terms of data duplication and transmissions.
This moderate increase is expected, given our mechanisms strategy of duplicating
data via secondary parent nodes. The extreme outlier cases in these box plots were
found to correspond to the same 1-hop cases previously mentioned. This indicates
that when our reactive scheme begins harming the network, this is observable at the
gateways; possible improvements based upon this observation are presented in the
next chapter.
Similar to how data recovery slightly improved, we also see that overheads are slightly
reduced for smaller threshold windows (i.e. a smaller difference between TSuspicious
and TUnreliable. This may be attributed to a quicker PRE transition from Suspicious
to Unreliable, which yields less additional secondary parent traffic.
From this first group of simulations, we have verified the effectiveness of our scheme
against a single attacker strategically placed near a gateway, identified a range of
viable thresholds on this simulation topology, and gained insight into expected over-
heads.
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4.4 Varying Attack Rate
After identifying a threshold pair that yielded significant data recovery against a 50%
selective forwarding attacker (Section 4.3), the effectiveness of the reactive scheme
with this threshold pair was tested against a variety of attack rates. The simula-
tion configuration and attacker placements were the same as those used in Section
4.3. However, these sets were repeated for the following selective forwarding rates:
{10%, 25%, 35%, 50%, 75%, 90%, 100%}.
As previously discussed, it is expected that an attacker’s PRV value will exceed the
theoretical value due to channel conditions and unsynchronized radio states. There-
fore, the threshold pair used to effectively detect an attacker dropping 50% of messages
requested to forward is expected to result in data recovery for slightly smaller drop
rates. As shown by the data delivery ratio plots in Figure 4.6, this is indeed the case.
For drop rates above 50%, we see significant data recovery (with the exception of the
problematic 1-hop cases similar to the ones previously discussed). Despite the thresh-
old being “tuned” for a 50% drop rate, slight data recovery is achieved for the 35%
drop case. For lower drop rates, however, we only see limited data recovery; without
better baseline connectivity, it is unlikely the thresholds can be set low enough to
effectively detect these cases without adversely affecting the network.
These results indicate that our reactive scheme is most effective against attacks and
failures that result in large amounts of data loss. While providing little benefit for
cases with lower data loss rates, we see that the impact of these lower drop rate
attacks is significantly less. However, in some applications, forcing an attacker to
drop less data per unit time in order to remain hidden may have benefits. This of
course assumes that dropping X amount of data over a longer period of time yields
less impact than dropping the same amount of data in a shorter time frame.
3
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Figure 4.6: Data delivery ratios for a single attacker, various drop rates
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4.5 Multiple Attackers
In order to evaluate the use of the candidate scoring conditions presented in Table 3.2,
another simulation group that includes multiple attackers was used. This simulation
group includes a number of attacker placements, presented in the following list. For
the random placement cases, configurations were removed if already covered by one
of the previous cases. Note that the hop counts presented here are approximate,
as they are based upon locations in the grid topology, where a “hop” exists only
between adjacent nodes. In all cases, attackers were configured to drop 50% of received
data.
• 2 Attackers, 1-hop away from the gateway
• 3 Attackers, 1-hop away from the gateway
• 2 Attackers, 2-hops away from the gateway
• 3 Attackers, 2-hops away from the gateway
• 2 Attackers, 3-hops away from the gateway
• 3 Attackers, 3-hops away from the gateway
• 2 Attackers, randomly placed within 4-hops from the gateway
• 3 Attackers, randomly placed within 4-hops from the gateway
Given that nodes closer to gateways generally have more influence over the flow of
data, we expect that the cases where multiple attackers are near the gateway would
yield significant impact. On the other hand, the same number of attackers further
from the gateway would be expected to be able to drop significantly less data.
Figure 4.7 shows that this expected behavior does indeed occur. For the 1-hop cases,
there is often little that can be done to avoid the attackers. In the cases where nodes
can transmit directly to the gateway (usually with a less than ideal link), we see
significant data recovery. However, the outliers in Figure 4.7 are indicative of cases
where the attackers are the only viable routes to the gateway; the blacklisting of
attack nodes results in no complete paths to the gateway.
As the multiple attackers are moved further from the gateway, we see that the vari-
ance of data delivery ratios decrease, and the median increase, indicating a decreasing
impact. As expected, the availability of alternative routing paths increases with the
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increased distance from the gateway, allowing for significant data recovery. Further-
more, this verifies our hypothesis that selective forwarding at a particular rate yields
greater impact near a gateway.
Data Delivery Ratios for Multiple Attackers
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Figure 4.7: Data delivery ratios for multi-attacker scenarios
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4.6 Alternative Route Opportunities via Additional Sinks
The purpose of the last simulation group was to determine whether CTP’s inherent
multi-gateway support could be utilized to yield even more opportunities for alternate
routes around attacking/failing nodes. As previous simulations have been run with
only a single gateway, a set of baseline simulations was first performed on the 100 node
grid toplogy with multiple gateways (placed in the corners of the network), in order
to gain better insight as to how additional gateways might provide additional attack
resilience. The results of these simulations are shown below, in Figure 4.8.
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Figure 4.8: CTP performance with multiple gateways
As the additional gateways are added to the network, we see the slight improvements
in the already near-ideal data delivery ratio. However, as the routing path lengths
decrease with the introduction of gateways, we see the average message latencies
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and number of transmissions decrease significantly. In these situations, the gateways
effectively divide the network into “subnetworks;” this would significantly influence
the impact of an attacker close to one of the gateways, as less data would be flowing
to that gateway.
To test this hypothesis, two attacker placements are used:
• Surrounding Attackers : All nodes 3-hops inward from one of the gateways
• Splitting Attackers : All nodes in columns 3 and 4 in the grid topology
Both of these networks are associated with significant compromise; we expect poor
data delivery ratios for only 1 sink, and increasingly better data delivery ratios as the
additional sinks are added. The data delivery ratios for the Surrounding and Splitting
cases are presented in Figures 4.9 and 4.10, respectively.
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Figure 4.9: Data delivery ratios for multiple gateways and Surrounding attackers
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Data Delivery Ratios with "Splitting" Attackers
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Figure 4.10: Data delivery ratios for multiple gateways and Splitting attackers
45
As expected, the single sink cases are associated with poor data deliveries. This is
worse in the Surrounding cases, where blacklisting eliminates the only viable routes
to the single gateway. Surprisingly, significant data recovery is still achieved in a
number of of single sink cases; this may be attributed to the use of the sink node as
a primary or secondary parent, despite unfavorable link qualities9.
From these plots, we see that the addition of gateways alone does indeed reduce
the impact of attackers. This is particularly true in the Splitting scenarios, as the
attacking/failing nodes in columns 4 and 5 of the grid topology are likely to become
leaf nodes. As the reactive schemes is introduced, we see additional data recovery
achieved; it is clear that increasing routing opportunities through the use of multiple
gateways complements our reactive scheme.
The overheads associated with these simulations are shown in the remaining plots in
this section. These plots compare the baseline CTP performance (with no attacks) to
the associated case including our reactive mechanism and attacks, with the intention
of showing the cost of achieving the data recovery shown in Figures 4.9 and 4.10.
These overheads follow similar trends to that observed in the previous simulation
results; in cases where few to no alternate routes are available, the reactive scheme
tends to produce excessive traffic, increasing overheads by an order of magnitude.
As alternative routes are made available via the introduction of multiple gateways,
we see data duplication, message latency and the number of transmissions decrease
toward reasonable overheads.
As shown in Figures 4.11 and 4.12, average message latencies decrease as expected
with the introduction of additional gateways. The outliers generally correspond to
messages being routed during the transient period where a different gateway starts
being utilized. The existence of slightly higher outliers in the 4 Sinks plots (as com-
pared to the 3 Sinks plots) may be indicative of nodes switching back and forth
between multiple gateways. As a simple hysteresis mechanism to prevent this, CTP
requires a neighbor to have an ETX 2.0 better than the current parent to warrant
a switch. However, it is likely that this condition will occur multiple times during a
transient period when upstream nodes are resolving the “best” paths to sinks. This
also suggests a limit to the benefits obtained by adding additional sinks to a network;
adding too many gateways may result in leaf nodes switching paths fairly frequently
until a stable state is finally reached.
9Recall the candidate score = 0 case discussed in Section 3.3.2.
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Average Message Latencies with "Surrounding" Attackers
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Figure 4.11: Average message latencies for multiple gateways and Surrounding attackers
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Average Message Latencies with "Splitting" Attackers
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Figure 4.12: Average message latencies for multiple gateways and Splitting attackers
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From the data duplication plots in Figures 4.13 and 4.14, we see that that the addition
of an additional gateway alleviates the strain on the network imposed through the
reactive process. However, adding the third and fourth gateways does not further
minimize data duplication, indicating a lower limit. Based upon the medians in
these plots, it appears that while responding to ongoing attacks, data duplication
will increase from approximately 0.03 to 0.09. If every message in the network had
been duplicated twice (perhaps via a traditional multipath scheme), this overhead
would have been 1.00. Therefore, by reducing the number of nodes impacted by the
attacker, the addition of gateways into the network alleviates the need to duplicate
a large amount of data. However, additional gateways alone cannot reduce data
duplication in the affected areas of the network; the reactive scheme will duplicate
data as needed in these areas in an attempt to ensure data delivery.
The transmissions counts shown in Figures 4.15 and 4.16 generally appear to mirror
the trends shown in the average message latency plots – significant improvement
occurs with the introduction of the second gateway, and moderate improvement occurs
with each added gateway.Furthermore, the trends present in 4.8 are also present.
Because each additional gateway effectively reduces the number of nodes downstream
from the attacker, fewer nodes are affected by the reaction process. With fewer nodes
reacting, routing beacon and secondary parent traffic is lessened.
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Data Duplication Ratios with "Surrounding" Attackers
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Figure 4.13: Data duplication ratios for multiple gateways and Surrounding attackers
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Data Duplication Ratios with "Splitting" Attackers
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Figure 4.14: Data duplication ratios for multiple gateways and Splitting attackers
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Transmissions with "Surrounding" Attackers
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Figure 4.15: Transmission counts for multiple gateways and Surrounding attackers
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Transmissions with "Splitting" Attackers
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Figure 4.16: Transmission counts for multiple gateways and Splitting attackers
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The results of the multi-gateway scenarios confirm the underlying themes that have
motivated multipath routing, and clearly illustrate significant attack-resilience bene-
fits. However, unlike traditional multipath schemes where data is always duplicated,
our distributed reactive scheme provides resilience to ongoing attacks with signif-
icantly less data duplication (also implying fewer transmissions), because data is
duplicated only as needed. As a trade-off for fewer transmissions, our scheme may
result in some data loss prior to detection. However, by carefully tuning the αPRE
and wPRE, a system designer could minimize this loss.
Although an accurate comparison of our scheme and traditional multipath schemes
would require the implementation of additional routing protocol simulation schemes,
simple estimates verify that our scheme yields fewer overheads. With our scheme’s
data duplication of 0.09 for 4 sinks, an average hop count of 2.5, and an average of
1.35 retransmission attempts per hop, and 80 messages, we estimate the number of
transmissions as:
[1.00 + 0.09][(80)(1.35)(2.5)] = 294.3 transmissions (4.4)
However, if a multipath scheme were to duplicate every message along a second dis-
joint path, the value of our data duplication metric would be 1.00 (assuming delivery
of every message). Using this value in the same calculation, we see a significantly
larger transmission count:
[1.00 + 1.00][(80)(1.35)(2.5)] = 540.0 transmissions (4.5)
When projected over a larger period of time, where the time spent reacting to an
attack is significantly less than the network uptime, we would expect the difference
between these estimated transmission counts to grow linearly. Based upon these es-
timates, we conclude that this distributed reactive scheme yields significantly fewer
overheads than a traditional multipath scheme, as data duplication is limited to the
time required to react to an ongoing attack. Assuming this reaction time will be
bounded, our scheme should always yield less data duplication and fewer transmis-
sions.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Future Work
One of the major contributions of this work has been the verification that a reac-
tive, autonomous, and distributed routing scheme can yield significant data recovery
against selective forwarding attacks, without requiring nodes to exchange auxiliary
trust or detection information. Furthermore, we have shown how such a scheme may
be integrated into the publicly available and well-used Collection Tree Protocol, mak-
ing re-use of existing design aspects where possible. As indicated by our results, for
properly selected thresholds, our scheme has potential to perform with only a modest
introduction of overheads, because of the transitory nature of the secondary parent
functionality. This scheme utilizes the multipath routing notation of achieving attack
resilience through data duplication, but only when an attack is occurring, yielding
fewer overheads under normal circumstances. Furthermore, we have provided some
insight into how the use of multiple gateways in network can yield even greater re-
silience to selective forwarding attacks.
We believe that our scheme would greatly complement the SARP protocol presented
in [22]. First, the introduction of our secondary parent functionality could allow for
some additional data recovery while a node’s trustworthiness is still being determined
and compared against other nodes’ reports. Secondly, our choice of CTP as the
base protocol provides inherent improvements over [22]’s static hop counts and single
gateway assumptions. Furthermore, if the trustworthiness of CTP data and routing
frame fields could be monitored and established using a framework similar to that
of SARP, we could begin addressing more realistic threat models in which attackers
manipulate data and routing frame fields.
As noted in a number of various sections, some limitations of our current scheme
provide a number of opportunities for future work and improvements. The results
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presented in Chapter 4 were indicative of a need for a “negative feedback” proto-
col mechanism to ensure that frequent false positive assertions of the Suspicious or
Blacklist states do not adversely affect network performance. In cases where such false
positives hindered data delivery, we also saw increased message latencies and data du-
plication ratios. Because these symptoms are observable from gateways, it may be
possible to generate alerts to network administrators, or perform automated recovery.
One possible method for automated recovery is the use of an authenticated “backoff”
broadcast from a gateway that informs nodes to cease the usage of secondary parents,
un-blacklist nodes, or to modify their TSuspicious and TUnreliable thresholds. In order
to ensure that such a feature is not abused, the usage of an authentication scheme
presented in [12] or [33] is highly recommended.
A simpler mechanism to recover from false positive blacklisting may include the use
of periodic clearing of a blacklist. Depending upon the criticality of the network
and the value of the data, this period may be short or long. A short period would
allow attackers re-entry into victims’ routing tables, but also reduce the effect of false
positives. On the other hand, a longer window would decrease the amount of data
an attacker could drop over time, and the risk of preventing valid nodes from being
allowed back into routing tables.
Another possible modification might include nodes adapting their thresholds as link
qualities change over time, or to observe local changes in message delivery as they be-
gin using secondary parents or blacklist parent nodes. CTP routing frames contain a
“C-bit” that denotes when a node is congested. The 2007 draft of The Network Work-
ing Group’s TEP123 [32] states that the associated congestion condition occurs when
a CTP node drops a data frame1. If nodes were to utilize a congestion status mech-
anism in the routing protocol, they could potentially start with high thresholds and
decrease them over time until congestion occurs. Once congestion starts occurring,
nodes could then revert to the previous thresholds and increase their transmission
timer (perhaps in an exponential backoff fashion).
As briefly mentioned in Section 3.2.2, the PRE Cache may also provide opportunities
for the detection of a data tampering attack. If (at the cost of additional memory
overhead) data payloads or message authentication codes were to be stored in the
cache, a match on the data origin and sequence number, but conflict on the data (or
MAC), would indicate data tampering. Future investigations might consider whether
1However, at the time of writing the TinyOS CTP implementation does not assert the C-bit.
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immediate blacklisting is appropriate, or determine an appropriate systematic ap-
proach to manipulating a node’s PRV value for this case. Additionally, an improved
message-matching scheme could be investigated to account for cases where an attacker
may manipulate the data origin and sequence number fields.
To better determine how our work may be integrated into other protocols, such as
SARP, an understanding of performance and limitations with respect to more ad-
vanced threat models may prove worthwhile. Such attack models include nodes that
vary their attack rates and reduce attack rates upon observing children choose sec-
ondary parents, nodes that cease routing beacons to become removed from routing
tables in order to rejoin and have their PRV re-initialized, and nodes that tamper
with CTP fields.
To achieve better performance against attackers dropping data at a lower rate, the
reactive scheme presented in this work could be extended to maintain PRVs for various
priorities/classes of messages. Based upon the importance and frequency of each class
of data, different αPRE values could be used to allow nodes to react more quickly
to parents dropping particular classes of data. Consider a network in which nodes
periodically generate low-priority data, as a normal network status “heart-beat,” and
generate high-priority data messages when important events occur in the monitored
environment. A node could then maintain three PRV values: one for low priority
messages, one for high priority messages, and another for all priority classes. If an
attacker only drops high-priority messages, the low-priority and all-priorities PRVs
may not be affected, but the high-priority PRV would provide an indication of a
Suspicious or Unreliable parent. A simple max() function of all three PRVs could be
used to determine which PRV to compare to thresholds.
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Appendix A
Modified CTP Snoop Interface Usage
Pseudo code for modifications to CTP’s usage of the TinyOS Snoop Interface is pre-
sented below. These modifications allow a node to determine if it has been selected
as a secondary parent, as well as monitor the parent node’s retransmissions.
event Snoop . r e c e i v e (message )
{
// Secondary parent r e c ep t i on
// ( Modi f i ca t i on to CTP)
i f ( message . secondary parent == my addr )
// Process message as i f i t were un i cas t to us
r e c e i v e ( message ) ;
endif
// Monitor parent re t ransmi ss i ons
// ( Modi f i ca t i on to CTP)
i f ( message . sou rce == my parent && pre cache . con ta in s ( message ) )
// Opt i ona l l y , can add a message v a l i d i t y check here
mark forwarded ( pre cache , message ) ;
endif
// Trigger route update i f a neighbor broadcas t wi th pu l l−b i t (P) s e t
// ( Standard CTP behav i or )
i f ( message . b i t s & PULL BIT)
per form route update ( ) ;
endif
}
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Appendix B
Modified Route Update Procedure
The below pseudo code describes the modified CTP route update procedure designed
to avoid inducing routing loops. For brevity, functionality pertaining to routing table
maintenance, congestion, and adaptive beaconing is not shown here. The functional-
ity of compute candidate score() is represented by Table 3.2. Note that this pseudo-
code is intended to illustrate the logical flow of the route update procedure; it is not
optimized for complexity and minimum memory utilization.
task route update ( p a r en t s t a tu s )
{
l i s t cand idat e s ;
r ou t e en t r y best ;
loop : entry in r o u t i n g t ab l e
i f ( entry . parent != INVALID ADDR && entry . parent != my addr )
entry . l i n k e t x = LinkEstimator . g e t l i n k q u a l i t y ( entry ) ;
entry . path etx = entry . etx + entry . l i n k e t x ;
i f ( entry . l i n k e t x > BAD LINK THRESHOLD)
continue ;
else
i f ( p a r en t s t a t e == SUSPICIOUS | | pa r en t s t a t e == UNRELIABLE)
entry . s c o r e = compute cand idate score ( entry ) ;
endif
cand idat e s . add( entry ) ;
endif
endif
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// Standard CTP behav i or
i f ( p a r en t s t a tu s == NORMAL)
best = so r t by e t x ( cand idat e s ) ;
// Avoid bad en t r i e s and only sw i tch i f
// neighbor ’ s ETX i s s i g n i f i c a n t l y b e t t e r
i f ( best != INVALID ADDR &&
parent . path etx − best . path etx > SWITCH THRESH)
parent = best
endif
secondary parent = NOSECONDARYNEEDED;
// Parent i s su sp i c i ou s or un r e l i a b l e .
else
// Sor t ing precedence : f i r s t score , then ETX
best = so r t by s c o r e and e t x ( cand idat e s ) ;
i f ( best != DO NOT CONSIDER)
// Adver t i s e l a c k o f ( secondary ) parent to ne i ghbors
i f ( p a r en t s t a tu s == UNRELIABLE)
parent = INVALID ADDR;
else
secondary parent = NO SECONDARY FOUND;
endif
e lse
i f ( p a r en t s t a tu s == UNRELIABLE)
parent = best ;
else
i f ( parent . path etx − best . path etx > SWITCH THRESH)
parent = best ;
else
secondary parent = best ;
endif
endif
endif
endif
endloop
}
